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NEUROSCIENCE'S NEW TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATING
FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS: ARE WE RETURNING TO
LOMBROSO'S BIOLOGICAL CRIMINALITY?

J W. Looney*

I. INTRODUCTION
Cesare Lombroso, the nineteenth century Italian criminologist, proposed a theory of criminality suggesting that criminal behavior was biologically derived and could be predicted by various physiognomic features.1
This concept was also promoted by Franz Joseph Gall, who proposed that
higher mental functions were localized in specific and distinct areas of the
brain.2 Gall believed these regions were marked by features on the cranium
(phrenology), as did Lombroso.3 Lombroso was so confident in his theory
that he proposed that those individuals who exhibited the appropriate physical features be irrevocably detained for life.
Modem localization hypotheses (a phrenology of social cognition) attempt to identify specific areas of the brain associated with personality or
social psychological constructs.5 With the advent of neuroimaging technology, noninvasive brain scans have been used in attempts to identify neural
mechanisms involved in romantic love, 6 deception detection, 7 racial prefe-

* Circuit Judge, 18-W Judicial Circuit; Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University
of Arkansas School of Law; B.S.A., University of Arkansas (1966); M.S. University of Missouri (1968); J.D. University of Missouri-Kansas City (1971); M.S. University of Missouri
(1976); M.J.S. University of Nevada-Reno (2008).
1. Steven K. Erickson, Minding Moral Responsibility: The Supreme Court's Recent
Mental Health Rulings, 8 ENGAGE 59, 59 (2007). See also Giuseppe Carri & Francesco
Barale, Cesare Lombroso, MD., 1835-1909, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 624, 624 (2004).
2. Martin Sarter, Gary G. Berntson & John T. Cacioppo, Brain Imaging and Cognitive
Neuroscience: Toward Strong Inference in Attributing Functions to Structure, 51 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 13, 15 (1996).
3. Id.
4. T. B. Benning, Neuroimaging Psychopathy: Lessons from Lombroso, 183 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 563, 563-64 (2003) (citing STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN:
REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1977)).
5. John T. Cacioppo, Tyler S. Lorig, Gary G. Berntson, Catherine J. Norris, Edith
Rickett & Howard Nusbaum, Just Because You're Imaging the Brain Doesn't Mean You Can
Stop Using Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 650, 654 (2003).
6. See id. at 657-58 (reviewing Andreas Bartels & Semir Zeki, The Neural Basis of
Romantic Love, 11 NEuROREPORT 3829, 3829-34 (2000)).
7. See Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Casefor Neuro
Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 426-29 (2007). See also Joelle Anne Moreno,
The Futureof NeuroimagedLie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 717, 735 (2009).
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rences and prejudices, 8 sexual arousal, 9 ethical decision making,' ° and consumer preferences," among others. More relevant, studies related to neural
topographies of aggression suggest that some criminal behavior may be
correlated with brain abnormalities. 12 This may be, as some commentators
suggest, "phrenological folly," or it may indicate that areas of the brain
may, at some point, be identified as predicting violent behavior.' 3 Lombroso
would be proud.
II. PREDICTING FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS

Predictions of criminal behavior, especially future dangerousness, have
become an important function of the legal system. Such assessments are
important in bail determinations, parole decisions, capital case sentencing,
sexually violent predator assessments,
involuntary civil commitments, and
14
in sex offender registration.
Dangerousness is a legitimate concern for courts in any pretrial release
decision. The federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 specifically authorizes a
court to consider the "nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or
the community" that would be posed by pretrial release of those charged
with a specific category of serious offenses. 5 In upholding this act, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority on the United States Supreme
Court, found no constitutional barrier to permitting a court, after an adversarial hearing, from finding that no conditions of pretrial release could assure the safety of the community or of any person.16 The government would
have to present clear and convincing evidence of a "demonstrable danger."' 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted a prior case to the effect that "'there is noth-8
ing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."
In most states a parole board must assess the likelihood of future offenses in evaluating a prisoner for early release. This evaluation often con-

8. Tovino, supra note 7, at 431-34.
9. Id.at 434-35.
10. Id. at435-37.
11. Id.at 437-39.
12. Dean Mobbs, Hakwan C. Lau, Owen D. Jones & Christopher D. Frith, Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLoS BIOLOGY e103.0693, e103.0695 (2007), available at
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/j oumal.pbio.0050103
[hereinafter
Mobbs et all.
13. Id.
14. Predictions of future behavior are of consequence to psychiatrists and psychologists,
given the growing concern for potential tort liability as illustrated in decisions such as Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The implications of new techniques of neuroscience for such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (2006).
16. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 759 (1987).
17. Id.at 750.
18. Id.at 752 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
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siders dangerousness as one factor in this decision. 19 An important consideration in some states with death penalty provisions is the necessity of a jury
finding that a defendant charged with a capital crime is likely to repeat the
act. In other states, the likelihood of repetition is at least an "aggravating
factor" that the jury may consider. Expert testimony about future dangerousness was approved in Barefoot v. Estelle, a 1984 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Some states have enacted sexually violent predator acts that allow for
civil commitment of persons found likely to engage in future acts of sexual
violence due to a current mental abnormality or personality disorder.2' Such
acts require an assessment of future dangerousness by a court similar to the
evaluation required for any other involuntary civil commitment. The added
factor for consideration in such cases is proof of a current mental condition
that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future.22

Ordinary involuntary civil commitment statutes in most states require a
finding by a court that the person is a danger to himself or to others. Once
the person is committed, reevaluation is usually left to the medical authorities. 24 However, if the person is committed following criminal proceedings
in which the person was found to be either incompetent to stand trial or not
guilty by reason of insanity, some states require follow-up hearings by the
court to determine if the person should be released. One factor to consider
is the likelihood of future dangerousness.2 6
Most states have enacted sex offender registration legislation requiring
those convicted of specified sex offenses to register upon release from incarceration or if placed on probation.27 These registration statutes normally
19. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 213.1214(1)(c) (1999) (requiring a panel, including a psychologist or psychiatrist, to certify that a prisoner "does not represent a high risk to
reoffend," in order to be eligible for parole in Nevada, when convicted of specified offenses);
Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1994) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that
Georgia's State Board of Pardons and Paroles uses a "Parole Success Likelihood Score,"
which was developed using large samples of parolees and considers prior and current incarceration for violent offenses).
20. 463 U.S. 880, 900-01 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2) (2000), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474-75 (2000).
21. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et seq. (Furse 2005). This legislation was
found to be constitutional in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). At least fifteen other
states and the District of Columbia have similar provisions. See Erica Beecher-Monas &
Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for
Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 309 n.40 (2006).
22. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 308-09.
23. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-47-207, -210 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
24. See id. § 20-47-207; id. § 5-2-3 10 (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
25. See id. § 5-2-310.
26. See id. §§ 20-47-207, -210; id. § 5-2-310.
27. See id. § 12-12-906 (LEXIS Repl. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 2005).
This registration requirement is known informally as "Megan's Law" in New Jersey and was
enacted on the federal level by the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Act in 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (codified as amended
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require a risk assessment to determine the exact registration 29requirements.2 8
This risk assessment evaluates the likelihood of reoffending.
The proliferation of these statutes illustrates our criminal justice system's subtle shift in focus away from punishment and onto prevention.30
Although this legislation has passed constitutional muster when tested, the
difficulty of accurately predicting future dangerousness has raised the question of whether this statutory focus is based on a dubious premise. For this
reason, a claim of violation of due process might provide for a successful
challenge in the future.3'
III. DIFFICULTIES IN ASSESSING FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS

In 1983, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Barefoot v.
Estelle, considered future dangerousness as an aggravating factor in capital
cases. 32 Writing in dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed concern about the
ability of mental health professionals to reliably predict long-term future
dangerousness. 33 He cited the amicus brief of the American Psychiatric Association that suggested such predictions were wrong two out of three
35
times. 34 At that time such predictions were based on clinical assessments.
In the intervening years, actuarial or statistical methods have emerged
which purport to be much more accurate. These methods evaluate a number
of risk factors which are scored to yield an objective measure and are
claimed by some researchers to be reliable predictors of future dangerousness. 36 Other researchers believe these methods are only "moderately predictive. 37
at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)).
28. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-906.
29. See id. § 12-12-913(c)(2)(A) (requiring that "factors relevant to a sex offender's
future dangerousness" be identified in the assessment); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11.
30. See Paul H. Robinson, PunishingDangerousness:Cloaking Preventive Detention as
CriminalJustice, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001). See also Christopher Slobogin, A
Jurisprudenceof Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (2003) (providing case examples).
31. See Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 56, 66-67 (2004). See also Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora'sBox: Sexual
Predatorsand the Politics of Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 1233, 1233 (2004)
(presenting specific examples).
32. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
33. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. Id. Justice White, writing for the majority, dismissed this concern and indicated that
juries could competently evaluate any shortcomings of expert testimony. Id. at 899-903.
35. See id.
36. See generally JOHN MONAHAN et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE
MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001) (addressing how clinical

tools can help anticipate violent behavior).
37. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 302 n.5. See also 0. Carter
Snead, Neuroimaging and Capital Punishment, 19 THE NEW ATLANTIS 35, 38-39 (2008)
("The use of cognitive neuroimaging data to diagnose psychological conditions relies entire-
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Thomas R. Litwack reviewed the literature on the relative merits of
clinical and actuarial assessments and concluded that the latest research
does not demonstrate that actuarial assessments are superior, especially with
regard to dangerousness. 38 He points out that such assessments are frequently used to determine whether confinement should occur or continue. 39 This
makes the clinical determination (or judicial determination) a "judgment" as
to whether the patient poses a risk of harm to himself or others within a future time span. 40 However, it is not a prediction of violence. 41 This point is
illustrated by Jones v. United States, where the Court found that confinement could be justified on proof of something less than the likelihood of a
violent act.42 A nonviolent act of attempted theft (a finding of dangerousness) could justify confinement.4 3
Litwack points out that clinical practitioners may consider available
actuarial data if they are relevant and meaningful. 44 Likewise, actuarial instruments are based on clinical assessment of clinical variables (i.e., psychiatric diagnosis). 45 He concludes that actuarial methods are not yet superior to clinical assessments.4 6
Because the "unaided abilities of mental health professionals to perform [the] task [of violence risk assessment] are modest at best," the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study helps evaluate risk factors for
violence and develop a risk assessment tool for use by clinicians.47 Using
106 risk factors commonly available in hospital records or clinical assessments, the MacArthur Study places its patients into one of five risk
classes. 48 There was a seventy-six percent probability of violence within
twenty weeks of discharge for the highest risk group, and a one percent
probability for the lowest risk group. 49 The approach is claimed to be highly
accurate (compared to other actuarial methods), and it involves a complex
computational model for which software has been developed.5

ly on the soundness of the diagnostic criteria-which, given the absence of specific biological markers for any psychiatric disorder, can be hotly contested.").
38. See Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus ClinicalAssessments of Dangerousness, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB.POL'Y & L. 409, 409 (2001).

39. See id.
at 425.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
43. Id.at 380.
44. Litwack, supra note 38, at 412-13.
45. Id.at412-13.
46. Id. at 437-38.
47. The MacArthur Research Network, The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study: Executive Summary, April 2001, http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last
visited on Mar. 9, 2010).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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One criticism of these risk-assessment approaches, regardless of accuracy, is that they are based on group data and not on an individualized assessment of dangerousness. 51 Although risk assessments based on group
data "may help identify populations that are likely to demonstrate an elevated recidivism rate and the judgment of dangerousness may thus be informed by this information, the dangerousness judgment cannot be reduced
to a score on an assessment device or to the diagnostic assessment of an
expert., 52 Nor do these assessments address the normative component of the
dangerousness judgment-the "moral inquiry that determines what particular threshold of risk justifies a particular legal consequence. 5 3
IV. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY

In spite of the confidence expressed in recent studies that the psychiatric and psychological communities can accurately predict future dangerousness, the search for new tools to aid in that endeavor continues. Recently, new developments in behavioral genetics have raised the question of
whether more accurate predictions of future dangerousness might be revealed in genetic codes.54 Research on the "biology of violence" suggests
that genes may influence behavior. 55 But, as stated by Beecher-Monas and
Garcia-Rill, "[a]ll behavior is a complex intermingling of nature and nurture. 56 Behavior also affects genes.5 7
Beecher-Monas and Garcia-Rill advise caution in reading too much into the conclusions of "Neo-Darwinian hardliners," who would explain flaws
of human behavior in purely genetic terms. 8 They point out that,
"[u]nfortunately, another easy answer to the problem of crime controlfinding a genetic basis for executing or locking up a violent individual and
throwing away the key-is similarly unsupported by evidence, 59 and their
research findings forcibly conclude that "[g]enetic
determinism is simply
60
unfounded when it comes to complex behavior.,
The latest developments are from neuroscience. Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI)is capable of measuring brain function and has
been proposed as a technique for studying everything from lie detection,
sexual arousal and ethical decision making, to racial preferences and preju51. See Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz, Marc W. Pearce & Robert F. Schopp, Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 471, 484
(2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 303-04.
55. Id. at 302-03.
56. Id. at 324.
57. Id. at 333-34.
58. Id. at 338-39.
59. Id. at 340.
60. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 340.
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dices. 6' A second type of technology in development is the so-called "brain
fingerprinting" technique, which uses electroencephalography (EEG) to
record electrical signals from the brain. 62 A third type is the computed tomography (CT) scans, which depict a difference in density of various types
of brain tissue.63
While it does not seem out of the ordinary to use such technology to
evaluate brain structure and, to some degree, brain function, it is less likely
that such technology will be used in the immediate future to explain behavior or to predict future behavior.64 Nevertheless, such technology could be
used in the types of proceedings outlined above-to predict future dangerousness. 65 In a dramatic expression of faith in such technology, the British
Home Secretary indicated in 2007 that convicted pedophiles would be required to undergo brain scans by MRI to aid in assessing the likelihood of
reoffending. 66 Such potential uses are based on the premise that "some kinds
of criminal behavior are associated with dysfunction of different regions of
the brain." 67 Studies demonstrate that violent individuals and convicted
criminals do have prefrontal cortex abnormalities and that other areas of the
brain may have dysfunctions as well. 68 Neuroimaging may reveal these dysfunctions.
To be clear, there is at present no reason to believe that all criminal behaviours, or indeed even all violent criminal behaviours, are
the result of organically dysfunctional brains. However, there is
ample evidence to suggest that some kinds of dysfunction are
likely to increase the probability of some kinds of behaviours that
society labels as criminal.69
One of the frequently cited studies was performed by Raine, Lencz,
Bihrle, LaCasse, and Colletti, using magnetic resonance imaging to study
brains of subjects identified with antisocial personality disorder (APD).7
61. Jane Campbell Moriarty, FlickeringAdmissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the
US. Courts, 26 BEHAV. Sc1. & L. 29, 30-35 (2008).
62. Id.at 31.
63. Id.
64. See id.at 47-49 (explaining that the images portrayed are reliable and that the problem is in the meaning and interpretationsof the images).
65. See Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the FederalRules
of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 322 (2007). The author suggests such uses may be
offered just as they might be used to suggest a person is not responsible for his or her actions,
for example, in an insanity defense. Id. at 334-36.
66. Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture and Forensic Psychiatry, 37 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHiATRY & L. 239, 239 (2009).
67. See Mobbs et al., supra note 12, at e103.0695.
68. Id.at e103.0695-e103.0696 (citing studies indicating that alternations in blood flow
have been noted by neuroscientists in the frontal lobes of violent individuals and convicted
criminals).
69. Id.at e103.0696.
70. Adrian Raine, Todd Lencz, Susan Bihrle, Lori LaCasse & Patrick Colletti, Reduced
Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality
Disorder,57 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119, 119 (2000).
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Raine and the others observed a reduction in prefrontal gray matter volume
in patients with APD, suggesting that the volume deficit may be related to
antisocial, psychotic behavior.7' Similar studies of violent offenders indicate
dysfunction in the frontal cortex.7 2 Furthermore, neuroimaging studies confirm that 7amygdala
dysfunction is associated with psychopathy in violent
3
offenders.
These attempts to identify the neuropsychiatric basis for violent behavior have caused some to question the relevance of these studies to the issue
of criminal responsibility. 74 Criminal responsibility is a legal concept, but
understanding the nature of causes of psychiatric-based disabilities can "inform us about the proportionate role that a biological deficit or a person's
choices may have had in generating a behavior., 75 The new technology of
fMRI may offer a path to applied forensic imaging in the future.76
V. LEGAL QUESTIONS
The use of this emerging technology for the evaluation of future dangerousness for any of the purposes outlined above raises a number of legal
questions. First, there is the basic issue of whether the present state of the
science can meet the standards for admissibility in judicial proceedings.
Second, Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination issues might be raised if prosecutors use these techniques in a criminal proceeding. Third, questions as to
whether a reasonable search was conducted may arise if these techniques
are deemed to constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Beyond these basic
legal considerations, there are right-to-privacy issues that arise when an
individual is held responsible for thoughts instead of actions.7 7

71. Id.at 123.
72. James R. Blair, NeurobiologicalBasis of Pyschopathy, 182 BRIT.J. PSYCHIATRY 5,

5 (2003).
73. Id.
74. See J. Arturo Silva, The Relevance of Neuroscience to Forensic Psychiatry, 35 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 6-9 (2007) (outlining the views of Michael Gazzaniga, a
neuroscientist, and Stephen Morse, a legal scholar, on the subject of neuroscience's relevance to legal doctrine).
75. Id. at 7.
76. Daniel D. Langleben & Frank M. Dattilio, Commentary: The Future of Forensic
FunctionalBrain Imaging, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 502, 502-04 (2008).
77. Stacey A. Tovino, Current in ContemporaryEthics: The Confidentialityand Privacy Implications ofFunctionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 844, 847

(2005).
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Evidentiary Problems

Generally, courts have been willing to accept future dangerousness testimony based on clinical judgment alone. This raises questions as to whether this relaxed approach, without any judicial inquiry as to scientific validity, meets the evidentiary standards of Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc,78 informally known as the Daubert test. 79 Beecher-Monas and
Garcia-Rill argue that it cannot meet those standards because it is "entirely
subjective, ungrounded in empirical data, and therefore unfalsifiable; has
been overwhelmingly castigated by the profession, and thus fails peer review, publication, and general acceptance; has no standards for its metho80
dology; and cannot meet the requirements for an acceptable error rate.
while more accurate, are tenuous
They argue that even actuarial predictions,
81
as a basis for depriving life and liberty.
The question arises as to whether brain-imaging technology, which on
the surface gives an imprimatur of "scientific," would improve the accuracy
of future dangerousness predictions and more nearly meet the Daubert standards. 82 The current state of brain-imaging technology for purposes of predicting future dangerousness would likely fail either the Daubert test, or the
much earlier and more permissive test for admissibility of evidence established in Frye v. United States,83 informally known as the Frye test. 84 The
technology has only been tested in laboratory conditions, and there is no
standardization in the testing techniques.85 Moreover, error rates have not
been established, 86 and it has yet to be proven that the technology has individualized reliability. 87 Overall, there are significant doubts as to the general
acceptance of brain-imaging technology.88 Not the least of the admissibility
78. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
79. See id at 589-95. In order for expert scientific testimony to pass the Daubert test
and be admitted into evidence, the testimony must be considered (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. at 592-93.
The reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony must be scientifically valid, and
capable of being applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 593. Two factors to consider are (1)
whether the scientific theory or technique can be tested, and (2) whether it has been subjected
to peer review and publication. Id. at 593.
80. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 307 n.26.
81. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOzO L. REv. 1845, 1900-01 (2003).
82. Moreno, supra note 7, at 735-37 (citing studies that suggest that brain scans and
cognitive neuroscience explanations enhance perceived validity).
83. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. EvD. 702.
84. Id.at 1014 (requiring that the admissibility of evidence obtained through a scientific
technique or process depends upon that technique or process having general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community).
85. Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be True?, 36 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 495 (2008).
86. See Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and CriminalProcedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 319-21 (2006); Moriarty, supra note 61, at 46-47. But see
Pettit, supra note 65, at 333-34.
87. See Pardo, supra note 86, at 319.
88. See Moriarty, supra note 61, at 46-47. But see Pardo, supra note 86, 321; Pettit, Jr.,
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problems is the fact89that the technology has not been shown to have individualized reliability.
One of the difficulties with evidence involving neuroimaging is that
any evidentiary use involves the interpretation of the images themselves, as
well as inferences as to the psychological status of the individual. 90 The
neuroimaging expert need not be, and frequently would not be, a psychiatrist. Yet, psychiatric expertise would be necessary for any diagnostic inferences that might be drawn from the brain images. As one scholar points
out, "There is cause for concern when a psychiatrist uses an image of a statistically 'abnormal' brain to draw conclusions about a defendant's sanity,
criminal responsibility or dangerousness." 9' The imaging evidence may be
unduly persuasive in spite of the lack of scientific support for its use to diagnose cognitive or behavioral impairments. 92 As a result, some psychiatric
testimony will always be necessary to tie the physiological status of the
brain to a mental disorder. Thus, the court will have to evaluate both the
validity of the particular brain imaging evidence offered ("technical validity") and the expert's inference ("inferential validity").
As to the technical validity, any evaluation by the court is not likely to
be difficult or controversial. The ability of the technology to depict what it
purports to depict is already accepted.9 3 The more difficult evidentiary issue
lies with the inferential validity, given the general skepticism toward psychiatric opinion testimony.9 4 Courts will tend to exclude an expert opinion if
95
they find an "unfounded inferential leap" from the image to the behavior.
Kulynych proposes adoption of Walker and Monahan's "social framework" approach to provide a context for such "soft science." 96 The idea is
that general conclusions from scientific research may be useful in determin-

supra note 65, at 333-34.
89. Pardo, supra note 86, at 319.
90. Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal
Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1259-64 (1997).
91. Id. at 1251.
92. See Helen S. Mayberg, FunctionalBrain Scans as Evidence in Court: An Argument
for Caution, 33 J. NUCLEAR MED. 18N, 18N (1992); C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing
Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry: Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 211, 224-27 (1995).

93. Kulynych, supra note 90, at 1265 (suggesting that this evaluation is similar to that
for other areas of scientific evidence and the model is set out in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2000)).
94. See Edmund H. Mantell, A Modest Proposal To Dress the Emperor: Psychiatricand
Psychological Opinion in the Courts, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 53, 75-78 (1994) (suggesting
that much clinical testimony is unreliable and inadmissible under the Dauberttest).
95. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 43.
96. Kulynych, supra note 90, at 1267 (citing Laurens Walker and John Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987)).
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ing factual issues in a specific case.97 The concept seems to fit here because
clinical opinion testimony must "draw from some sort of data base" to render a diagnosis or opinion. 98 Kulynych notes that "[i]n each case, the expert
witness attempts to extrapolate from a general corpus of research findings to
a prediction about the behavior or cognitive capacity of a particular individual."99

B.

Fifth Amendment Issues

Neuroscientific evidence gathered for the purpose of predicting future
dangerousness may run counter to the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The privilege may prohibit forcing individuals to submit
to providing compelled and incriminating testimony. 1°° Certainly, some of
the uses of the technology outlined above would satisfy the Fifth Amendment privilege. Pardo concludes: "Namely, it would apply when the government compels the tests in order to obtain evidence of the incriminating
informational content of subjects' propositional attitudes." 10 1 What is not
clear, however, is whether the information obtained directly from the brain
is an "act" of communication or a "product" of communication. 10 The distinction may be of some importance in determining Whether the privilege
applies, given the Supreme Court's holding in Schmerber v. California,
involving blood samples.0 3 The distinction in Schmerber was between
"physical" evidence-such as blood tests, which does not raise the issue of
the Fifth Amendment privilege-and "testimonial" evidence, which does
raise the issue.'0 4 Physical evidence may be compelled; testimonial evidence
may not be. 10 5 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court focused on the
process by which the evidence was compelled, as opposed to the product of
the information revealed. 10 6 For example, in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, in an
effort to clarify the distinction, the Court referred back to Schmerber and the
passive role the defendant played in providing the evidence. 10 7 In the context of neuroscience evidence, the question arises as to whether an fMRI or
EEG is physical or testimonial.' 0 8 Brain imaging measures brain activity
that cannot be controlled by the subject. 10 9 In that sense, the process fits the
97.
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mold of physical evidence." But the extortion of incriminatory thoughts
from the brain would seem to make the evidence testimonial, which would
then violate the Fifth Amendment."'
C.

Fourth Amendment Issues

Fourth Amendment issues are also implicated in the use of neuroimaging tests for at least some of the future dangerousness assessments. One can
argue that everyone has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" to brain details. Compelling such tests would seem to be a "search" under current interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.1 12 Probable cause requirements
would be applicable. While the government might not be able to use the
techniques as "mental fishing expeditions, '...' such tests could be compelled
without violating Fourth Amendment restrictions provided that probable
cause exists to believe the test would reveal evidence and that a warrant is
obtained (or a warrant exception is applicable).' 14
D.

Privacy Issues

The use of technology for predicting of future dangerousness implicates privacy issues. Tovino poses the question as follows: "Finally, and
regardless of the context, do all individuals have the right to cognitive privacy, or the privacy of their own thoughts? Can state action that punishes an
individual or holds an individual responsible for thoughts, but not actions,
violate the individual's cognitive privacy?"' 15 This latter concern has been
highlighted in the popular press with questions of how privacy could be
threatened by use of this technology. 1 6 The "fundamental liberty interest"
recognized by the Supreme Court as residing in the Due Process Clause has
included a right of personal privacy. Surely, this could include "security
' 17
from unwanted government intrusion into the mind." "
Henry T. Greely raises the question of whether the "forced intrusion
into one's mind" might be violative of due process." 8 He raises the issue
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111.
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beyond the litigation context by speculating about a remote screening device which would require no obvious intrusion.11 9 Should such a device be
perfected, the privacy issues would be even more significant than those arising from use by consent. While this invasion of "self' raises privacy concerns, Mobbs, Lau, Jones and Frith, remind us that:
[F]unctional brain imaging is not mind reading. Not only can it
not tell us what or how a person was thinking at the time of a legally relevant act, it also cannot tell us with reliable accuracy
what a person is thinking while being scanned. In this respect,
brain imaging can only provide post hoc explanations.120
As Michael S. Gazzaniga emphasizes: "Neuroscience reads brains, not
minds." 121
VI. CONCLUSION

The future of the science of brain imaging is unlimited. As neuroscience develops and the related technology is perfected, calls for its use to
predict future behavior will increase. This poses what has been called a
"challenge to one of the central principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence: namely, that people are responsible for their behavior, not their proclivities-for what they do, not what they think., 122 A further caveat is offered by Abigail A. Baird:
While human neuroscience has a great deal to offer with regard to
the likely causes of human behavior, it is not yet capable of predicting--or for that matter, explaining-any individual's specific
intentions or behaviors. It is tempting to draw great truth from
brightly colored pictures of brain activity (which are actually statistical maps of the probability of activity in those regions, not the
be wrong to do so with regard to the
actual activity), but it would
1 23
actions of an individual.
Stephen J. Morse, only partially in jest, has characterized those who
make moral and legal claims about the relationship of new neuroscience ' to
24
criminal responsibility as suffering from "Brain Overclaim Syndrome."'
He is critical of the "[m]onolithic brain explanation of complex behavior"
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and suggests that any correlation
between brain states and the criteria for
125
responsibility is a fantasy.
Morse warns that if causation (i.e., some abnormality detected by neuroscience techniques) is to be regarded as per se an excusing condition, "no
one could ever be responsible for anything. 1 26 Furthermore, if neuroscience
is to be used in criminal responsibility assessments for exculpatory purposes, it could as easily be used to inculpate.
The latter point is illustrated by studies that show that the second most
powerful aggravating factor (next to the crime itself) for juries in death penalty cases is evidence of future dangerousness.1 27 Taken to the extreme, the
use of neuroscience techniques to aid in predicting future criminal behavior,
in these or any of the procedures where future dangerousness is an issue,
could vindicate the nineteenth century Italian criminologist, Lombroso.
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